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This paper develops in certain directions the work of Meyer in [3], [4], [5] and
[6] (see also Routley [10] and Asenjo [11]). In those works, Peano’s axioms
for arithmetic were formulated with a logical base of the relevant logic R,
and it was proved finitistically that the resulting arithmetic, called R♯, was
absolutely consistent. It was pointed out that such a result escapes incau-
tious formulations of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, and provides
a basis for a revived Hilbert programme. The absolute consistency result
used as a model arithmetic modulo two. Modulo arithmetics are not or-
dinarily thought of as an extension of Peano arithmetic, since some of the
propositions of the latter, such as that zero is the successor of no number,
fail in the former. Consequently a logical base which, unlike classical logic,
tolerates contradictory theories was used for the model. The logical base for
the model was the three-valued logic RM3 (see e.g. [1] or [8]), which has the
advantage that while it is an extension of R, it is finite valued and so easier
to handle.
The resulting model-theoretic structure (called in this paper RM32) is
interesting in its own right in that the set of sentences true therein consti-
tutes a negation inconsistent but absolutely consistent arithmetic which is
an extension of R♯. In fact, in the light of the result of [6], it is an extension
of Peano arithmetic with a base of a classical logic, P♯. A generalisation
of the structure is to modulo arithmetics with the same logical base RM3,
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but with varying moduli (called RM3i here). We first study the properties
of these arithmetics in this paper. The study is then generalised by vary-
ing the logical base, to give the arithmetics RMni, of logical base RMn and
modulus i. Not all of these exist, however, as arithmetical properties and
logical properties interact, as we will show. The arithmetics RMni give rise,
on intersection, to an inconsistent arithmetic RMω which is not of modulo i
for any i. We also study its properties, and, among other results, we show
by finitistic means that the more natural relevant arithmetics R♯ and R♯♯ are
incomplete (whether or not consistent and recursively enumerable). In the
rest of the paper we apply these techniques to several topics, particularly
relevant quantum arithmetic in which we are able to show (unlike classical
quantum arithmetic) that the law of distribution remains unprovable. Aside
from its intrinsic interest, we regard the present exercise as a demonstration
that inconsistent theories and models are of mathematical worth and interest.
2 Definitions
We begin with an arithmetical language L with a single binary relation =,
constant 0, variables x, y, z,..., connectives ¬, &, →, term operators +, ×,
′, and universal quantifier ( ) (also written (∀)). Terms (open and closed)
and sentences and wffs (open and closed) are defined in the usual way.1 ∃ is
defined as ¬∀¬, A∨B is defined as ¬(¬A & ¬B), and 0(n) is an abbreviation
for 0
′′...′, with n iterations of the superscript.
Definition 1. The relevant logic RQ is given by the following axiom schemata
and rules. Axioms:
(1) (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C))
(2) A → ((A → B) → B)
(3) A & B → A
(4) A & B → B
(5) (A → B) & (A → C) → (A → B & C)
(6) A → A ∨ B
(7) B → A ∨ B
(8) (A → C) & (B → C) → (A ∨B → C)
1We occasionally use Fx1...xn for an open formula in which x1...xn may occur free.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:5) 2021, Article no. 6
382
(9) A & (B ∨ C) → (A & B) ∨ (A & C)
(10) ¬¬A → A
(11) (A → ¬A) → ¬A
and the following quantificational schemata and all closures of them:
(12) (x)A → (t/x) (t any term)
(13) (x)(A → B) → ((x)A → (x)B
(14) A → (x)A (x not free in A)
(15) (x)(A ∨ B) → (A ∨ (x)B) (x not free in A)
(16) (x)A & (x)B → (x)(A & B)
Rules:
(17) ⊢ A, ⊢ A → B /∴ ⊢ B
(18) ⊢ A, ⊢ B /∴ ⊢ A & B
To obtain the logic RMQ, add the Mingle axiom A → (A → A). The relevant
arithmetics R♯ and RM♯ in the language of L are given by the following.
Logical axioms and rules are those of R and RM respectively. Both have
additional artihmetical axioms and rules:
Arithmetical axioms:
#1 (x, y)(x = y ↔ x′ = y′)
#2 (x, y, z)(x = y → (x = z → y = z))
#3 (x)(x′ 6= 0)
#4 (x)(x+ 0 = x)
#5 (x, y)(x+ y′ = (x+ y)′)
#6 (x)(x× 0 = 0)
#7 (x, y)(x× y′ = (x× y) + x)
Arithmetical rule:
RMI ⊢ F0, ⊢ (x)(Fx → Fx′) /∴ ⊢ (x)Fx
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To obtain the arithmetics R♯♯ and RM♯♯, add to R♯ and RM♯ respectively the
rule
Ω ⊢ F0, ⊢ F0′, ..., ⊢ F0(n), ... (for all n) /∴ ⊢ (x)Fx
The arithmetics P♯ and P♯♯ are Peano arithmetic with a base of classical logic
and, respectively, without and with rule Ω.
Definition 2. An RM3i model is an ordered pair 〈Di, I〉 where Di are the
integers modulo i, and I is a function which assigns to the terms, operators
and wffs of L the following values.
(1) For individual variables x, I(x) ∈ Di
(2) I(0) = 0
(3) I(+), I(×), I(′) are the operations +, ×, ′ of arithmetic mod-
ulo i respectively.





Open and closed wffs are assigned values in the three-valued Sugihara matrix
{+1, 0,− 1} characteristic for RM3 as follows.
(5) For atomic wffs t1 = t2, where t1, t2 are terms, I(t1 = t2) = 0
iff I(t1) = I(t2) (modulo i), otherwise I(t1 = t2) = − 1.
(6) I(A → B), I(A & B) and I(¬A)) are determined by the
three-valued tables for RM3.
(7) I((x)A) = glb{y : I ′(A) = y} for every x-variant I ′ of I.
A sentence A is RM3i-true under interpretation I iff I(A) ∈ {+1, 0}. A is
true in the model RM3i iff A is RM3i-true under all interpretations I. The
arithmetic RM3i is the set of sentences true in the model RM3i.
Definition 3. A subset S of L is an L-theory (relative to logic L) iff (1)
if A ∈ S and ⊢L A → B then B ∈ S, and (2) if A ∈ S and B ∈ S then
A & B ∈ S. An L-theory S is (negation) consistent iff for all closed wffs
A ∈ L , not both A ∈ S and ¬A ∈ S; otherwise inconsistent. S is trivial (or
absolutely inconsistent) iff S = L , otherwise nontrivial. S is ω-inconsistent
iff for some F , F0(n) ∈ S for every n, and also ¬(x)Fx ∈ S. S is complete
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iff for all closed wffs A, either A ∈ S or ¬A ∈ S. S is ω-complete iff the rule
Ω holds for S, i.e. for all F , if FO(n) ∈ S for every n, then (x)Fx ∈ S. The
rule γ holds for S iff, if A ∈ S and ¬A ∨ B ∈ S, then B ∈ S. S is prime iff
for all closed wffs A, B if A ∨B ∈ S then at least one of A ∈ S, B ∈ S
3 The Arithmetics RM3i
Proposition 1. The arithmetic RM32 is an RQ theory. Every theorem of R♯
is true in the model RM32. The wff 0 = 0′ is not true in that model. Hence
R♯ is absolutely consistent.
Proof. See [3].
The significance of this result is, as discussed in [3], [4] and [5], that relevant
Peano arithmetic can be finitistically proved to be absolutely consistent, un-
like classical Peano arithmetic P♯. This goes some way to resurrecting the
programme of Hilbert of a finitistic demonstration of the (absolute) consis-
tency of mathematics. However, every primitive recursive function is repre-
sentable in R♯, so a proof of the negation consistency of R♯ within R♯ remains
impossible, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. It is also provable
that P♯♯ is included in R♯♯ (see [6]) so that, since P♯ ⊂ P♯♯ and R♯♯ ⊂ RM32,
we do have a proof of the absolute consistency of P♯ (and hence of its nega-
tion consistency, which coincides with absolute consistency in P♯ but not R♯♯).
This does not run contrary to Gödel’s second theorem, however, since one
step in the proof, viz. P♯♯ ⊂ R♯♯, uses methods not representable in R♯. Again,
the negation consistency of R♯♯ (and hence R♯) is demonstrable (see [6]), but
the result uses equally strong methods. These results also constitute an ar-
gument for the pragmatic virtues of the relevant logics. In fact, as we show
later by finitistic methods, no sentence of the form 0(n) = 0(m) for distinct n,
m is provable in any of R♯, R♯♯, RM♯, RM♯♯. (See also [3].) Hence relevant logic
has considerably better control over its Peano arithmetic than does classical
logic. We go on now to consider the properties of the arithmetics RM3i.
Proposition 2. Every arithmetic RM3i is inconsistent and ω-inconsistent
but absolutely consistent.
Proof. 0 = 0′ is easily seen not to be in any RM3i, so all are absolutely
consistent. But all are inconsistent, since (e.g.) in any model RM3i I(0 =
0) = 0, so by the RM3 tables for negation, I(¬(0 = 0)) = 0 also, hence
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both are true. For ω-inconsistency, observe that any sentence of the form
¬(0(n) = 0(m)) takes value +1 or 0 in every RM3i. So in particular ¬(0 = 0),
¬(0 = 0′), ..., ¬(0 = 0(n)), ... are all theorems. But the value of ¬(0 = 0)
is 0, so (x)¬(0 = x) takes a maximum value of 0, so ¬(x)¬(0 = x) takes a
minimum value of 0 (by tables for ¬), and so is a theorem.
Proposition 3. For any F , ⊢
RM3
i (F0 & ... & F0(i−1)) → (x)Fx.
Proof. If F0 & ... & F0(i−1) takes the value +1, then by all the RM3 tables
for →, each conjunct does. Any assignment to the variable in Fx must
therefore also give the value +1, whence (x)Fx takes that value. If the
antecedent takes the value 0, each conjunct takes the value 0 or + 1, so
again any assignment to the variable in Fx takes value 0 or +1 (and 0 for
some assignment). Hence (x)Fx takes value 0, and so by the RM3 tables,
(F0 & ... & F0(i−1)) → (x)Fx takes value 0. If the antecedent takes value
− 1, the whole wff takes value + 1.
Proposition 4. RM3i is ω-complete.
Proof. If ⊢ F0, ..., ⊢ F0(n), ... for every n, then ⊢ F0, ..., ⊢ F0(i−1); so that
⊢ F0 & ... & F0(i−1). Hence by Proposition 3 and the fact that each RMi is
closed under modus ponens for →, ⊢ (x)Fx.
Proposition 5. RM3i contains R♯, R♯♯, RM♯, RM♯♯.
Proof. As in [2], this is a matter of verifying that the axioms of R♯ etc. are
true in RM3i and that the rules preserve truth. That Ω is truth preserving
follows from Proposition 4.
Proposition 6. RM3i is complete and prime.
Proof. Primeness follows from the RM3 tables for ∨: for closed wffs A, B,
if I(A ∨ B) ∈ {+1, 0} one of I(A), I(B) must do so. Completeness is then
immediate on the observation, easily checked, that ⊢
RM3
i A ∨ ¬A.
Proposition 7. RM3i is decidable.
Proof. We observe first that it is standard to show that an open wff A is a
theorem iff its universal closure is. By Proposition 3, however, all universal
quantifiers in closed wffs are eliminable in favour of finite conjunctions. Since
the value of atomic wffs 0(n) = 0(m) is effectively given, the value of all
universally closed formulas, conjunctions and negations can be calculated.
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4 Axiomatising RM3i
The purpose of this section is to axiomatise the arithmetics RM3i. We pro-
ceed via a number of lemmas.
Definition 4. RM3i♯ is the arithmetic obtained by adding to RM♯ the axioms
0 = 0(i), and for every j, 2 ≤ j < i, 0 = 0(j) ↔ 0 = 0′.
Lemma 1. In RM3i♯, ⊢ (x, y, z1, ..., zn)(x = y & Fxz1...zn → Fyz1...zn).
Proof. In [4] or [5].
Lemma 2. In RM3i♯, ⊢ (x)(x = 0 ∨ x = 0′ ∨ ... ∨ x = 0(i−1)).
Proof. The proof uses the rule RMI (Definition 1). Plainly we have ⊢ 0 =
0 ∨ 0 = 0′ ∨ ... ∨ 0 = 0(i−1). But also we have, from axiom #1, ⊢ (x)(x =
0 → x′ = 0′), ⊢ (x)(x = 0′ → x′ = 0(2)), ..., ⊢ (x)(x = 0(i−2) → x′ = 0(i−1)).
Also, using 0 = 0(i) and Lemma 1, ⊢ (x)(x = 0(i−1) → x′ = 0). Hence by
RMQ principles, ⊢ (x)(x = 0 ∨ ... ∨ x = 0(i−1) → x′ = 0 ∨ ... ∨ x′ = 0(i−1)).
The lemma follows using rule RMI.
Lemma 3. In RM3i♯, ⊢ (F0 & ... & F0(i−1)) ↔ (x)Fx, if x is not free in F .
Proof. Right to left is immediate from axiom (12). Left to right: using
Lemma 1 and RMQ principles, we have
⊢ (x)((x = 0 ∨ ... ∨ x = 0(i−1)) & F0 & ... & F0(i−1) → Fx).
Distributing the quantifier,
⊢ (x)(x = 0 ∨ ... ∨ x = 0(i−1)) & (x)(F0 & ... & F0(i−1)) → (x)Fx.
The first conjunct of the antecedent is a theorem. Hence if x is not free in
F , we have from axiom (14) and rule (18), the derived rule
D : ⊢ F0,..., ⊢ F0(i−1) /∴ ⊢ (x)Fx
But now we also have ⊢ F0 & ... & F0(i−1) → F0, ..., ⊢ F0 & ... & F0(i−1) →
F0(i−1). Hence by rule D, ⊢ (x)(F0 & ... & F0(i−1) → Fx). Distributing
quantifiers and using axiom (14) we have ⊢ F0 & ... & F0(i−1) → (x)Fx as
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required.2
Definition 5. Let t be 0 = 0 and f be ¬0 = 0.
Lemma 4. In RM3i♯, 0 = 0′, ¬0 = 0′, t and f are related as in the RM3










Proof. The proof, essentially verifying theorems in RM3i♯, is lengthy but not
difficult. Details are omitted.
Lemma 5. In RM3i♯, for any wff A, we have either ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0′ or ⊢ A ↔
0 = 0 or ⊢ A ↔ ¬0 = 0′.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A. We need only consider the case
where A is closed, since the case where A is open follows by axiom (12).
Furthermore the quantifier case in the inductive clause can be ignored since
by Lemma 3, quantifiers can be eliminated in favour of a conjunction.
Base. A is t1 = t2. In view of Lemmas 1 and 2, we need only consider
where t1 = t2 ∈ {0, 0
′, ..., 0(i−1)}. First, let A be 0(n) = 0(n) for some n,
0 < n ≤ i − 1. Now certainly ⊢ 0 = 0 ↔ 0 = 0; but also ⊢ 0′ = 0′ ↔ 0 = 0,
..., ⊢ 0(i−1) = 0(i−1) ↔ 0 = 0, by repeated applications of axiom #1. If A
is 0(n) = 0(m) where n < m ≤ i − 1, then we have ⊢ 0 = 0(|n−m|) ↔ 0′ =
0(|n−m|+1), ⊢ 0′ = 0(|n−m|+1) ↔ 0(2) = 0(|n−m|+2), ..., ⊢ 0(n−1) = 0(m−1) ↔
0(n) = 0(m), whence ⊢ 0 = 0(|n−m|) ↔ 0(n) = 0(m). But it is an axiom that
⊢ 0 = 0′ ↔ 0 = 0(|n−m|). Hence ⊢ 0 = 0′ ↔ 0(n) = 0(m). If n > m, we have
⊢ 0(n) = 0(m) ↔ 0(m) = 0(n) via the symmetry of identity (which follows from
#2), which reduces the case to the previous one.
2We also note that it is straightforward to show that provable equivalences are replace-
able in all contexts. See [4] or [5].
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Inductive clause. (a) Negations. If ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0′ or ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0 or
⊢ A ↔ ¬0 = 0′, then evidently ⊢ ¬A ↔ ¬0 = 0′ or ⊢ ¬A ↔ 0 = 0 or
⊢ ¬A ↔ 0 = 0′. The second disjunct uses Lemma 4. (b) Conjunctions. We
have ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0′ or ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0 or ⊢ A ↔ ¬0 = 0′, and ⊢ B ↔ 0 = 0′
or ⊢ B ↔ 0 = 0 or ⊢ B ↔ ¬0 = 0′. We have to show ⊢ A & B ↔ 0 = 0′ or
⊢ A & B ↔ 0 = 0 or ⊢ A & B ↔ ¬0 = 0′. Evidently these follow from the
equivalences of Lemma 4. (c) Implications. These follow, in a like fashion,
from the equivalences of Lemma 4. This completes the lemma.
Lemma 5 means that adding to RM♯ 0 = 0(i) and 0 = 0(j) ↔ 0 = 1 for
all j with 2 ≤ j < i forces exactly three distinct propositions on us, two the
negations of each other and the third its own negation. But that is precisely
the structure of the logic RM3. Thus there would be no point in attempting
a weaker logical extension of RM3 with these axions (though we should note
that, in general, the 0 = 0(j) ↔ 0 = 0′ are not all independent) since only
three of its values would be used, isomorphically with RM3. Lemma 5 also
enables us to axiomatize the models RM3i.
Proposition 8. The theorems of RM3i♯ are exactly the truths of RM3i.
Proof. That all theorems of RM3i♯ are truths of RM3i is a standard matter
of showing that the (extra) axioms are true, since we already have that RM♯
is verified in RM3i. Lemma 5 does all the work in the converse. For suppose
A is true in RM3i. Now certainly not ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0′, for, since all theorems of
RM3
i♯ are true, A ↔ 0 = 0′ would be true, so that 0 = 0′ would be true (by
a simple argument). Hence ⊢ A ↔ ¬0 = 0′ or ⊢ A ↔ 0 = 0. But ⊢ ¬0 = 0′
and ⊢ 0 = 0. Hence ⊢ A.
5 Extending the Logic: The Arithmetics RMni
When we move to consider weakening the logical base to the logics RMn (n
odd: an even n will not permit an inconsistent arithmetic) characterised by
the n-valued Sugihara matrices or chains, we run into the problem that not
every modulus will permit distinct false equations to occupy distinct false
points in the matrix, enabling us to take advantage of the logical resources
of the weaker logic (longer chain). In fact, we prove that given the logical
apparatus of RM, if j and k are relatively prime, then at least one of 0 = 0(j)
and 0 = 0(k) is equivalent to 0 = 0′. To show this, we prove something quite
a bit stronger which is of independent interest.
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Proposition 9. In R♯, for any i, j we have ⊢ (0 = 0(i) ◦ 0 = 0(j)) ↔ 0 =
0(gcd(i,j)), where A ◦ B =DF ¬(A → ¬B), and gcd(i, j) is the greatest common
divisor of i and j.
Proof. Right to left. ⊢ 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(ki) (any k, i). (Reason: ⊢ 0 =
0(i) →. 0(i) = 0(2i) → 0 = 0(2i), but ⊢ 0 = 0(i) ↔ 0(i) = 0(2i); hence,
⊢ 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(2i). Now ⊢ 0 = 0(i) →. 0(i) = 0(3i) → 0 = 0(3i). But
⊢ 0(i) = 0(3i) ↔ 0 = 0(2i); so from ⊢ 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(2i), ⊢ 0 = 0(i) →
0 = 0(3i). And so on.) Hence, since gcd(i, j) divides both i and j, we have
⊢ 0 = 0(gcd(i,j)) → 0 = 0(i) & 0 = 0(j). But ⊢R A & B → A ◦ B.
Left to right. First note that ⊢R A → (B → C) ↔. (A ◦ B) → C, so
it suffices to prove ⊢ 0 = 0(i) →. 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0(gcd(i,j)). We now invoke
the well-known arithmetical fact that the gcd of any pair i, j is expressible
in the form ki + lj, where exactly one of the integers k, l is positive. Thus
it suffices to prove that ⊢ 0 = 0(i) →. 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0(ki+lj), where ki + lj
is positive and only one of k, l is positive. Since we have permutation,
(⊢R A → (B → C) →. B → (A → C)), we may assume without loss
of generality that it is k which is positive. Now we observe that ⊢ 0 =
0(i) →. 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0(ki). (Reason: (a) ⊢ 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0 follows
from ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0(j) = 0 →. 0 = 0 and ⊢ 0 = 0(j) → 0(j) = 0. (b)
⊢ 0 = 0 →. 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(i) follows from the transitivity of identity.
Combining (a) and (b), ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(i). But as already
shown, ⊢ 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0(ki).) But now note that 0 = 0(j) →. 0 =
0(ki) → 0 = 0(ki+lj) (Reason: ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0(ki) → 0(j) = 0(ki). Since
ki + lj is positive and l < 0 < k, ki > j. Therefore, we can write from
axiom #1—using the proof as in Lemma 5—⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki) →
0 = 0(ki+(− 1)j). Permuting, ⊢ 0 = 0(ki) →. 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0(ki+(− 1)j). But
now ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki+(− 1j)) → 0(j) = 0(ki+(− 1)j). Replacing the last
equation by its equivalent, ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki+(− 1)j) → 0 = 0(ki+(− 2)j).
So permuting back, ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki) → 0 = 0(ki+(− 2)j). The argument
can obviously be repeated to get ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki) → 0 = 0(ki+(− 3)j),
..., ⊢ 0 = 0(j) →. 0 = 0(ki) → 0 = 0(ki+lj) as required.) We can now combine
these two using ⊢R (A →. B → C) → ((B →. C → D) → (A →. B → D)),
to get the desired result. This proves Proposition 9.
We also have immediately, that if i, j are relatively prime then ⊢ (0 =
0(i) ◦ 0 = 0(j)) ↔ 0 = 0′; and in particular that ⊢ 0 = 0(i) →. 0 = 0(j) →
0 = 0′. Now it is possible to show in RM♯ that, if 0 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0′,
then ⊢ (0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0′) → 0 = 0′ (see [4] or [5]). We may therefore
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deduce, as promised, that in RM♯ if i and j are relatively prime, then one of
⊢ 0 = 0(i) → 0 = 0′ and ⊢ 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0′.
These facts tell a lot of what there is to say about embedding arithmetic of
modulus i into the RMn. For example, if i is prime then there are only three
points occupied in RMn: − j (at which are 0 = 0′, 0 = 0′′, ..., 0 = 0(i−1)),
0 (at which are 0 = 0, 0′ = 0′, ..., 0(k) = 0(k), all k, and their negations),
and + j (the negations of formulae at − j; {− j, 0,+ j} are closed in any
RMn with respect to &, ∀ and → of course). This is isomorphic to RM3i.
Furthermore, if j is relatively prime to (any) modulus i, then 0 = 0(j) must
be equivalent to 0 = 0′.
It is also immediate that if any two equations 0 = 0(j), 0 = 0(k) are at
points other than that occupied by 0 = 0′, then j, k have a common divisor
> 1. Indeed the equation 0 = 0(gcd(j,k)) must also be at some point distinct
from 0 = 0′ (by Proposition 9 again, else one of 0 = 0(j), 0 = 0(k) implies
0 = 0′). Further, the equation 0 = 0(gcd(j,k)) for each pair of points must
be no greater than either (else ⊢ 0 = 0(j) → 0 = 0(kj) fails to be verified).
Moreover, there is a single common divisor distinct from one for all points
distinct from 0 = 0′: if there were two, they would have to have a common
divisor distinct from 0 = 0′. And that common divisor is at a point no greater
than any other point distinct from 0 = 0′.
Thus the RMni look like this. At the bottom is 0 = 0′, 0 = 0′′, .... The next
point up on the Sugihara chain is occupied by a “base” equation 0 = 0(j), and
for every other equation 0 = 0(k) higher up the chain (including the modular
equation 0 = 0(i)) j is a divisor of k. If l is a multiple of k, k is no higher
than l. Every multiple k of j occupies a point distinct from 0 = 0′, while
every nonmultiple of j is equivalent to 0 = 0′. In addition we have to satisfy
⊢ 0 = modulus →. 0 = x → 0 = modulus− x, and also ⊢ 0 = modulus. This
means that any two multiples of the base j which add up to the modulus
occupy the same point. Where x exceeds the modulus, of course, 0 = x is
equivalent to 0 = (x mod i), where (x mod i) < i. Equations of the form
x = y are equivalent, in virtue of x = y ↔ x′ = y′, to 0 = 0(|(x−y)|). Negations,
conjunctions, implications and quantifications are then determined as usual.
This does not quite nail down RMni uniquely, however. We have for RM716,
consistent with the above conditions:
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0 = 160
0 = 8− 1
0 = 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 14− 2
0 = odd− 3
0 = 160
0 = 4, 8, 12− 1
0 = 2, 6, 10, 14− 2
0 = odd− 3
or
but there do not seem to be any further conditions restricting the RMni.
That is, it seems to be that any RMni satisfying the above constraints is
possible. In particular, for any i there is some n (e.g. 3) satisfying the
constraints; and for any (odd) n there is some i (if n = 2j + 1, take e.g.
arithmetic modulus 2j , and for k ≤ j, send 0 = 0(2j−k) to point − k and
make appropriate adjustments).
Thus modulus and size of matrix interact strongly, and not all combina-
tions resist isomorphism with a smaller matrix size. We will however con-
tinue to refer in the next section to RMni, with the understanding that these
may not be unique and that a particular i might force an isomorphism with
RMm
i for lesser m. With that qualification, we note that the RMni all have
the properties of the RM3i: inconsistency, nontriviality, containment of RM♯♯
etc., completeness, primeness, ω-completeness, ω-inconsistency. We omit the
proofs.
6 The Arithmetic RMω
In this section we study the intersection of all the models RMni.
Definition 6. The arithmetic RMω is the intersection of all the truths of all
the RMni.
Proposition 10. RMω is inconsistent, ω-inconsistent and nontrivial. If n
and m are distinct, then 0(n) = 0(m) is not in RMω.
Proof. Every RMni contains 0 = 0, ¬0 = 0. Also, every RMni contains
¬0 = 0, ¬0 = 0′, ¬0 = 0′′, ... but also ¬(x)¬0 = x. Further, 0 = 0′ is not in
some (in fact all) RMni. Finally, 0(n) = 0(m) is not in RM3|n−m|+1.
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Proposition 11. RMω is ω-complete.
Proof. Let F0, F0′, F0′′, ... all be in RMω. Then they are true in every RMni.
But every RMni is ω-complete, so (x)Fx is true in every RMni, and so is in
RM
ω.
Proposition 12. R♯, R♯♯, RM♯, RM♯♯ are all included in RMω.
Proof. Each of these systems is included in every RMni.
Proposition 13. The nontheorems of RMω are recursively enumerable.
Proof. This is a standard type of argument. Every RMni is decidable, so set
the Turing machines for each RMni to work consecutively. Eventually, if A
is a nontheorem of some RMni, some Turing machine will say so.
Problem 1. Is RMω decidable? Is it axiomatisable? Say by adding ¬(x)¬0 =
x′ to RM♯?
Proposition 14. RMω is incomplete.
Proof. Consider the wff A: 0 = 0(2) → 0 = 0′. In RM32, this gets the
value 0 → − 1 = − 1, and so is not a truth. In RM33, however, it gets
− 1 → − 1 = +1; and so its negation, ¬(0 = 0(2) → 0 = 0′) gets value − 1
and so is not a truth of RM33. Hence, neither A nor ¬A is in RMω.
Thus we also have:
Proposition 15. R♯, R♯♯, RM♯, RM♯♯ are all incomplete.
If Proposition 1 sidesteps Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, the
significance of these last two propositions is that they parallel and contrast
with—though very simply—Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. They are
not conditional, as the Gödel/Rosser theorem is, on the assumption of con-
sistency; indeed RMω is inconsistent. Nor do they need methods not for-
malisable in P♯ to prove the assumption of consistency and so detach the
conclusion of incompleteness: the above proof is perfectly finitistic. In ad-
dition, the present result holds independently of the assumption of a recur-
sively enumerable proof procedure, unlike the Gödel/Rosser theorem. Any
non-recursively-enumerable arithmetic in the language L and included in
RM
ω has the same property. In particular, R♯♯ and RM♯♯ are not recursively
enumerable.
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The case for some relevant arithmetic being true arithmetic rests on the
claim that the deductive relations of relevant logic are correct while those
of classical logic admit invalid inferences. Quantified R looks to be a good
candidate for the logic in question (though the present remarks apply to any
sublogic of R). The objection to R♯ as being true arithmetic, however, is just
the objection to P♯: since it is recursively enumerable and since all primitive
recursive functions are representable therein, if consistent it is incomplete.
The move to P♯♯ as a candidate is mirrored relevantly by the move to R♯♯. But
unlike the case of P♯♯, the expanded language of R♯♯ means that we do not
have a guarantee of completeness via the Ω-rule. The above incompleteness
results mean that R♯♯ (and RM♯♯ ) are open to the same objection that P♯
and R♯ are. Mind you, the mere fact of incompleteness in a candidate for
true arithmetic does not seem to us to be so serious (see e.g. Mortensen and
Priest [9]). More serious is what is unprovable: neither 0 = 2 → 0 = 1 nor
¬(0 = 2 → 0 = 1). For what our intuition is worth, the latter feels true to
us.
The fact that RMω is incomplete implies that the RMni do not form a
chain or even a (lower) semilattice under subsethood. For if they did, it
would be simple to show that since all the RMni are complete, so must
RM
ω be. However, RMω is complete in a weaker sense. To show this, it is
instructive to take a detour through the RMni.




Definition 8. A wff of L is extensional iff it contains no occurrences of →.
A theory Th is extensionally complete iff for every closed extensional wff A,
either A ∈ Th or ¬A ∈ Th.
Proposition 16. If A is a closed extensional wff, then, for any k and any
i, if A is true in RM3ki then A is true in RM3i.
Proof. We use the fact that in all these arithmetics ¬(A & B) ↔ ¬A ∨ ¬B
and ¬∀ = ∃¬, to drive negations through conjunctions and quantifiers. So we
only need to consider wffs which are disjunctions, conjunctions and universal
and existential quantifications of basic equations and unequations (i.e. of
the form ¬t1 = t2). The quantifiers can also be eliminated in favour of finite
conjunctions and disjunctions in the usual way, so we only need to consider
conjunctions and disjunctions of basic equations and unequations. Further,
for the latter we need only consider the terms in {0, 0′, ..., 0(ki−1)}.
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Base. If 0(n) = 0(m) is true in RM3ki, then for some j ≥ 1, |n − m| = jki.
Hence |n −m| = (jk)i, where jk ≥ 1; so 0(n) = 0(m) takes value 0 in RM3i.
No equation takes the value + 1 in RM3ki. Equally, however, no unequation
takes the value − 1 in any RM3l; so trivially every unequation true in RM3ki
is true in RM3i.
Inductive step. (i) A is B & C and true in RM3ki. Then B and C are both
true in RM3ki, whence by the inductive hypothesis they are both true in
RM3
i, so B & C is. (ii) A is B ∨ C and true in RM3ki. But RM3ki is prime,
so at least one of B, C is true in RM3ki, so by the inductive hypothesis is
true in RM3i, so B ∨ C is. This completes the proof.
Proposition 17. The extensional truths of the RM3i form a lower semilattice
with respect to subset inclusion.
Proof. Any pair of arithmetics RM3i, RM3j have a common lower bound
RM3
ij , by the previous proposition. A greatest lower bound is then available
since there are only a finite number of candidates
We note that the lower semilattice is not complete (as a semilattice) since
the infinite set {RM3i : i prime} has no lower bound in the semilattice. (We
can complete it, however, by adding the extensional truths of RM3ω.) The
previous proposition now enables us to prove:
Proposition 18. RM3ω is extensionally complete.
Proof. If A is extensional and not true in RM3ω it is not true in RM3i for
some i. If ¬A is not true in RM3ω it is not true in RM3j for some j. Hence
neither A nor ¬A would be true in RM3ij. But every RM3k is complete,
contradiction.
Now we can return to the question of the extensional completeness of
RM
ω.
Proposition 19. For each i and n the extensional truths of RM3i are just
those of RMni.
Proof. We prove that RM3i ⊆ RMni; the converse is similar. As before, we
take the base clause to equations and unequations and the induction with
respect to &, ∨, ∀, ∃; and we ignore terms other than {0, ..., 0(i−1)} because of
⊢ (x)(x = 0∨ ...∨ x = 0(i−1)). Further, we can ignore the ∀, ∃ cases, since in
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both RM3i and RMni, ∀ and ∃ are eliminable in favour of & and ∨. Evidently,
the equations of RM3i are just those of the form 0(n) = 0(n+ki) for some k ≥ 0.
All of these are true in RMni. Also, every unequation (i.e. ¬0(n) = 0(m)) is
in RMni anyway. The inductive clause for & is straightforward. For ∨, we
use the fact that RM3i is prime.
Now, however, we can observe that it follows from Proposition 19 that the
extensional truths of RMω are exactly those of RM3ω. (Reason: RMω ⊆ RM3ω
is evident. Conversely, if A ∈ RM3ω then A ∈ RM3i for all i; so by Proposition
19, A ∈ RMnω for i.) It immediately follows that
Proposition 20. RMω is extensionally complete.
The route we chose to Proposition 20 has the interest that it reveals the
relations between the RM3i and on the one hand RM3ki and on the other
RMn
i. However, Proposition 20 also follows from a more general, though
perhaps less deep, result, Proposition 21.
Definition 9. A secondary equation is any sentence A such that ⊢ A → t.
A secondary unequation is any sentence A such that ⊢ f → A (see [4] or [5];
recall from Definition 5 that t is 0 = 0 and f is ¬0 = 0).
Proposition 21. Any inconsistent arithmetic extending R♯ is extensionally
complete.
Proof. The details are contained in [4] or [5]. First note that in any inconsis-
tent extension of R♯, ⊢ t → f (See [4] or [5]; essentially the reason is that if
⊢ A & ¬A for some A, then since ⊢ ¬A ↔ (A → f), ⊢ f . But ⊢ f ↔ (t → f),
so ⊢ t → f .) But it can be shown that union of the secondary equations
and secondary unequations is closed with respect to the operators ¬, & and
∀. Finally it can be shown that every equation is a secondary equation and
every unequation a secondary unequation. Proposition 21 follows.
One final point to make is to show again how, relevantly, concepts can
diverge which coincide classically.
Definition 10. A theory is E-complete iff whenever (∃x)Fx is in the theory,
so is [one of F0], F0′, F0(2),....
[In RMω, we may expect E-completeness] with respect to extensional wffs to
coincide with ω-completeness. However, we have, despite the ω-completeness
of RMω:
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Proposition 22. There is an extensional wff (∃x)Fx in RMω such that none
of F0, F0′, F0(2),... are in RMω.
Proof. (∃x)(0 = x′) is in RMω since it is in every RMni. But 0 = 0′, 0 = 0′′,
... are each refutable in some RMni, and so not in RMω.
The explanation of the difference from the classical case is, of course, that
classically a theory is either consistent or trivial, and consistency together
with completeness guarantees E-completeness iff ω-completeness no matter
what the logic in question. But relevantly, theories can be neither consistent
and nontrivial. The equivalence can thus break down in such cases.
7 An Inconsistent Extension of R♯♯ Without
Mingle
The finite arithmetics studied up to now have all had the property that
mingle, A →. A → A holds, so that one of A → B, B → A is true. In the
present section we display an arithmetic for which this is not so. For base










3We acknowledge in this section the help of John Slaney’s computer programs, and the
DEC-10 computer for executing them.
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Negation is as suggested by the notation: F = ¬T, 1 = ¬8, 2 = ¬7, 3 = ¬6
and t = ¬f All values above and including t are designated. Conjunctions
and disjunctions are respectively lower and upper bounds in the lattice. The
→ table is as follows.
→ F 1 2 3 t f 6 7 8 T
F T T T T T T T T T T
1 F t t t t 8 8 8 8 T
2 F 3 t 3 t 7 8 7 8 T
3 F 2 2 t t 6 6 8 8 T
∗ t F 1 2 3 t f 6 7 8 T
∗ f F F F F F t t t t T
∗ 6 F F F F F 3 t 3 t T
∗ 7 F F F F F 2 2 t t T
∗ 8 F F F F F 1 2 3 t T
∗ T F F F F F F F F F T
It is mechanical (literally!) to verify that all the theorems of R hold in
CL2. Note though that mingle fails e.g. at 7 →. 7 → 7. Into CL2 we code
arithmetic modulo 105, which we call CL2105, via the following rules.
(1) I(0(n) = 0(m)) = t iff for some k ≥ 0, |n−m| = 105k
(2) I(0(n) = 0(m)) = 3 iff for some k ≥ 1, |n −m| = 15k but for
no k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 21k
(3) I(0(n) = 0(m)) = 2 iff for some k ≥ 1, |n −m| = 21k but for
no k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 15k
(4) I(0(n) = 0(m)) = 1 iff for some k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 3k but for no
k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 15k and for no k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 21k
(5) I(0(n) = 0(m)) = F otherwise, i.e. iff for no k ≥ 1, |n−m| = 3k
Negations, conjunctions and → are as for CL2. Quantifiers are now treated
as they were in §2, and that enables us to verify the quantificational axioms
of R as well.
Proposition 23. The theorems of R♯♯ are all true in CL2105.
Proof. The details are omitted. Axiom #2 is lengthy, but not in principle
difficult.
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Problem 2. What are the general conditions under which a modular arith-
metic can be embedded in a nonmingle lattice? What mods will admit of such
treatment (not all do, which explains the otherwise bizarre choice of modulo
105), and what conditions must equations sent to incomparable points satisfy?
8 Fermat’s Last Theorem
One advantage of having inconsistent extensions of P♯, R♯, etc., is that we
can entertain the possibility of constructing inconsistent models to falsify
arithmetical sentences, the truth of which is problematic. Take, for example,
Fermat’s last theorem. As is well known, if the denial of FLT is not provable
in arithmetic then FLT is true. Hence if in some inconsistent model of P♯
¬FLT can be made to fail, FLT must be true. Unfortunately, in RMω and all
its finite modular extensions, ¬FLT is equivalent to FLT (considering both
as extensional formulae), and both are true. In fact the inability to refute
¬FLT is not confined to an RM-ish logic. Given any model in which ⊢ t → f ,
i.e. in any inconsistent extension of R♯, it can be shown that ¬FLT → FLT,
but that both ¬FLT and FLT are true (though not necessarily equivalent).
Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that there are other ways
of producing inconsistent extensions of P♯ which would yield a refutation of
¬FLT. We remark, for what it is worth, that the intensional version of FLT,
i.e. (x, y, z, n)(xn + yn = zn → x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ y = 0 ∨ y = 1 ∨ z = 0 ∨ z =
1 ∨ n = 0 ∨ n = 1 ∨ n = 2), is refutable. Choose x = y = z = n = 3
in RM39. Then for this instance, the consequent takes value − 1. But the
antecedent takes the value of 18 = 9 which in RM39 is 0. But 0 → − 1 = − 1,
and the value of a universal quantification is the minimum of the values of
its instances. So the value of the intensional FLT is − 1 (and so it is not
provable in R♯).
9 Conclusion
We conclude with the observation that, since negation consistent theories are
a special case of nontrivial theories, there is no reason for relevant mathe-
matics to “reject” model theory as classically conceived. Relevant mathe-
matics proposes itself as an extension to the classical case rather than as an
alternative, though it must be admitted that the extension might be seen
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to have more desirable properties by being less restrictive. An example is
the classical identification of negation consistency with nontriviality, which
has, we believe, no justification. Relaxation of that identification means,
for example, that limitative theorems such as those of Gödel have to be
re-examined. It also means, as we have seen, that theories can be consid-
ered in which concepts which coincide classically no longer coincide, but are
nonetheless mathematically well-behaved and interesting. Furthermore, it
opens the possibility that inconsistent arithmetics might enable the solution
of traditional problems via the demonstration of the independence of prob-
lematic sentences from formalised arithmetic; the latter being, of course, a
traditional hope of model theory. But we stress that models developed classi-
cally do not suddenly fail to be legitimate in relevant mathematics. Instead,
one can choose to vary the class of truths in the model in accordance with
some nonclassical logic, and compare the result with the classical case. The
resulting change in viewpoint cannot impoverish insight into the nature of
mathematical structures, but rather can only enrich it.
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